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INSURANCE LAW – BREACH OF CONTRACT; CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION 
 
Summary  
 
An appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment in a breach-of-contract action 
arising from a denial of a homeowner’s insurance claim under the policy’s “earth movement 
exclusion” clause.  
 
Disposition and Outcome  
 
The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of partial 
summary judgment, finding : (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the “earth 
movement exclusion” clause excluded coverage for damages to Appellant’s house, and (2) the 
district court improperly relied on Schroeder v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. to support its 
conclusion that Respondent properly disclaimed coverage.
2
  
 
Facts and Procedural History  
 
Appellant Mildred Powell (“Powell”) obtained homeowner’s insurance from Respondent, 
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Liberty”). The standard form insurance policy 
contained an “earth movement exclusion” clause, which excluded losses caused by “(e)arth 
movement, meaning earthquake including land shock waves or tremors before, during or after a 
volcanic eruption; landslide, mine subsidence; mudflow; earth sinking, rising or shifting.” The 
policy also contained a “settling” clause, which further excludes losses resulting from “settling, 
shrinking, bulging or expansion, including resultant cracking, of pavement, patios, foundations, 
walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings.” 
 
In July 2005, a water pipe in Powell’s house exploded, flooding the dirt sub-basement.  
Thereafter, her house suffered a shift in its foundation, and extensive separation in the walls and 
ceilings of several rooms. Powell filed a claim based on these damages under the homeowner 
insurance policy she purchased from Liberty. An expert chosen by Powell and hired by Liberty 
concluded that the house was being affected by an expansion of supporting clay soil “likely 
present in lesser degrees in the past,” but “severely aggravated by the intrusion of a significant 
amount of water” due to the exploding water pipe. Liberty nonetheless denied Powell’s claim, 
citing the policy’s earth movement exclusion clause. 
 
Powell subsequently hired two civil engineering professors to conduct a second inspection of 
the house. The professors found no evidence of earth movement, and concluded that the 
structural damages resulted from swelling of the foundational clay facilitated by access to water. 
With these conclusions, Powell made another request for reconsideration, which Liberty again 
denied.   
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 Schroeder v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F. Supp. 558 (D. Nev. 1991) 
Consequently, Powell filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District Court, alleging: (1) 
breach of contract, (2) breach of duty of good-faith and fair-dealing, and (3) breach of Nevada 
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act.
3
 Liberty filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
with respect to the breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims. The district court granted the motion 
as to the bad-faith claim,
4
 but initially denied the motion as to Powell’s breach-of-contract claim, 
finding a genuine issue existed as to what caused the damage to Powell’s house.5 Thereafter, 
both parties hired experts to re-inspect Powell’s house. Based on conclusions derived from these 
inspections, Liberty renewed its motion for partial summary judgment of the breach-of-contract 
claim. 
 
 The district court granted Liberty’s renewed motion for partial summary judgment, 
concluding that: (1) there was movement in the earth below the house, which either directly or 
indirectly caused the damage to Powell’s house, and (2) the policy underlying Schroeder, where 
a similar earth movement exclusion clause was at issue, explicitly excluded any damage caused 
directly or indirectly by soil movement. 
 
Discussion
6
 
 
The Earth Movement Exclusion Clause is Ambiguous 
 
Powell claimed the district court erred in concluding that soil expansion caused by a water 
leak from a pipe fits within the scope of the earth movement exclusion clause, as defined in 
Respondent’s policy. The Court noted that under Nevada’s common-law, it will interpret and 
enforce the plain and ordinary meaning of a contract provision if the language is unambiguous.
7
 
Whether an insurance contract is unambiguous turns on whether it creates a reasonable 
expectation of coverage as drafted.
8
 Any ambiguity in the policy language will be construed 
against the insurer, as the policy’s drafter.9 Clauses excluding coverage must be interpreted 
narrowly “as to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the insured.”10  
 
The Court next turned its attention to earth movement exclusion clauses in general. 
Historically, earth movement exclusion clauses were created to protect insurers from catastrophic 
events that are nearly impossible to insure against, due to their unpredictability. Other 
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jurisdictions have often found these exclusion clauses to be ambiguous, and have thus construed 
them narrowly to include only naturally-occurring events.
11
  
 
The Court then examined the earth movement exclusion clause in Liberty’s policy. The Court 
noted that the definition of “earth movement” in Liberty’s policy contained both examples of 
man-made events (e.g. mine subsidence), and naturally-occurring catastrophes (e.g. earthquake). 
The policy also contained a generalized reference to “sinking, rising, and shifting earth” without 
any clarifying cause. Since Liberty’s policy neither limited “earth movement” to any particular 
category of events, nor stated explicitly that the clause excluded damages caused by any category 
of events, the Court found the exclusion clause to be ambiguous.
12
 Therefore, the Court reversed 
summary judgment based on a genuine issue as to whether Liberty’s policy excludes the type of 
damages suffered by Powell’s house. 
 
The Court went on to outline several requirements for insurers seeking to exclude coverage 
by virtue of an exclusion clause in its policy. First, the insurer must write the exclusion in 
obvious and unambiguous language in its policy. Second, the insurer must establish that the 
interpretation excluding coverage is the only interpretation that could fairly be made. Finally, the 
insurer must establish that the exclusion clearly applies to the particular case under review. Since 
Liberty’s policy failed to meet this criterion, the Court further concluded that Liberty is unable to 
deny coverage of the claim if the district court determines that the damage was caused by a 
ruptured pipe. Thus, the district court erred in granting Liberty’s motion for summary judgment.  
 
Distinguishing Schroeder 
 
Powell also claimed the district erred in relying on Schroeder to support its conclusion that 
Respondent’s policy disclaimed coverage. In Schroeder, water from a ruptured pipe caused soil 
to settle, which led to damages to a building insured by the Defendant. Although the cause of 
damage was similar in both cases, the Court distinguished Schroeder from the present case based 
on differences in the  respective “earth movement exclusion” clauses. First, the Schroeder policy 
made clear the list of events is non-exhaustive, whereas Liberty’s policy does not. Second, 
Schroeder’s anti-concurrent clause made clear that damages are excluded based on any 
movement in the earth, notwithstanding the cause. Finally, Schroeder’s clause explicitly 
referenced earth movement combined with water, whereas Liberty’s definition does not. Because 
Schroeder’s holding rests on the specific language of the policy, language which is absent from 
Liberty’s policy, the Court concluded that Schroeder does not control the outcome in the case at 
bar.   
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 The Court also rejected Respondent’s argument that the “settling” clause helped rectify the ambiguity of “earth 
movement” because (1) the district court did not rely on the “settling” clause in reaching its conclusion and (2) other 
jurisdictions interpreting similar “settling” clauses also narrowly construed them to encompass only naturally-
occurring events. 
Conclusion 
 
As the drafter of the insurance policy, insurance providers carry the burden of 
establishing that damages or losses filed by the policyholder are properly disclaimed under any 
expressed earth movement exclusion clauses contained within the insurance policy. In particular, 
the language of the exclusion clause must be obvious and unambiguous. Any ambiguity will be 
interpreted against the insurer as to effectuate the reasonable expectation of the insured at the 
time of drafting.     
